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NATURE OF THE CASE
This case was a criminal
action brought by the State of Utah
against Defendant-Appellant Loren
Craig Sims, charging him wifh the
crime of Rape in violation of Title
76, Chapter 53, Section 15, Utah
Code Annotated 1953.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
In the District Court of the
Third Judicial District, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on the 28th
day of October, 1971, the jury found
the defendant guilty of Rape. On
December 6, 1971, the Defendant
was sentenced to imprisonment in
the Utah State Prison for the indeterminat
terI'l. as provided by law for the
crime of Rape,said term to be served
concurrently with his sentence in
Case No. 23425.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks in the alternative
an order of this Court reversing
the verdict and judgment rendered
at trial and directing the District
Court to dismiss the case, or in
the alternative an order of this
Court reversing the verdict and
judgment rendered at trial ~~d
remanding the case to the T~ird
District Court, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, for a new trial
consistent with the ruling of this
Court.
-1-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Trial of the Defendant for
the c::-ime ?f R~pe under an infoq
charging him with violation of
Title 76, Chapter 53, Section
15, Utah Code Annotated 1953 ,
commenced on October 20 , 1971 ,
at 10:00 a.m. in the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District, Salt Lake County, Stat
of Utah, the Honorable Gordon
R. Hall, Judge, sitting with a
jury. The State of Utah presentei
its case consisting of testimony
and evidence summarized as follo1

1. Pauline Link, the proseetq
witness, stated that she met Sims
on Friday December 4, 1970; that,
he picked her up according to
·
prior arrangements, at a party
including several people, held
at 73 S Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah. Miss Link and the Defend~
got in to his truck, drove a hi tel:
to the University, and then proce
to J.Ir. Sim's automotive shop
located at 24 Harvard Avenue,
Salt Lake City, Utah. Miss Link
said Sims wanted to go there to
get some wine. She said that she
recalled that the shop was dark
when they arrived. She testified
that Sims unlocked the door,
which had a padlock on it, went
in the shop and 2..pparently got
the wine, and returned to the
truck (T.85-92).

-2-
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She testified that she and
Sims drove toward Park City during
which they had a couple of ~eers,
and as they got part way up the
canyon Sims truck malfunctioned
and stopped. They turned around
and returned to Sim's shop to
get another car.
She testified
that-when they approached the
shop for the second time the
shop was also dark; (T.93) that
they went inside and switched
cars~
She testified that during
the time they were in the shop
Sims asked her if she "Hanted
to ball" and she said no. She
indicated that Sims made no other
advances toward her at this
t~me(T.95).

She then testified that
they drove up Millcreek Canyon,
turned around and came part way
doHn the canyon at which time
they stopped the vehicle and parked
near the side of the road.
She
testified that during this time
he gave her a "little kiss",
but that he made no other advances
toHard her (T.96).
She testified
that they then Hent to the home
of a friend of Sims by the name
of Lewis Arnold on Michigan Avenue
at about 17th East where they
remained for approximately one-half
hour, during Hhich time they
consumed some additional alcohol.
They then drove to a home which
11iss Link said was occupied by

-3-

her boyfriend whose name is "Cor
at approximately 33rd South an<l
2nd W~s t.
After they had detcrn, 1
that ner boyfriend was not home
Sims said that he wanted to 6ao
back ~o his shoJ? to ~urn ~he lig1.
on prior to taking Miss Link horn:
(T.97).
.
She testified that she was
in the sixth day of her menstrua:
period and that she had had no
sexual intercourse for a period
of five or six days.
She state<l ·
that she was wearing corduroy
pants, a shirt, and a matching
corduroy coat (T.99).
She testified that as they
approached the shop the shop Has .
dark but there \vas some residual;
light.
She stated that Sims told!
her that he was afraid to go intoj
the shop alone.
He got out of \
the truck and she said she "belie·.
he took off the lock from the
door" (T .100).
She said that
\
they entered the shop holding
hands, Craig slightly in front
of her, after 1vhich time she passr
him and proceeded slightly ahe~dl1
of him into the shop. She test1fr
that as they went toward the ba~
of the shop between two automob1h
she was aware of being struck
'
in the head with several blows.
She says that she recalled that
her watch was broken and that
,
her wrist was bruisecl by the f?rc'.j
of the blows, and that she uit1mai
J

I

!
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sank to the floor unconscious
(T.102)~- She testified that when
she a1voke her head was throbing
,
tnere
was a considerable amount '
of blood, and that her pants had
been· "pulled dmm". She stated
that her pants were unbuttoned
and that there were no tears in
them. She did however state that
two buttons were missing at the
time she regained consciousness
(T.104). In response to the question
as to exactly where her pants were,
she stated that they were not off
her feet or her legs, but they
were "down". She also indicated that
at the time of the incident she
had had no injuries to her breasts.
She stated that her clothes
at the time of the trial were in
the same condition as they had
been when they were removed from
her after the incident, and the
clothes were admitted into evidence.
The clothes had stains on them
which appeared to be blood. States
Exhibit No. 10, a pair of womens
panties were admitted into evidence.
The prosecutrix stated that when
she had put them on that evening
they were clean. They did bear
some dirt and other soil when introduced
at the trial (T.107).
Miss Link then testified
that Sims helped her into a Corvette
automobile told her they were
going to g~ to the hospital, and
drove directly up State Street
-5-

toward the L.D.S. Hospital. Du 1
the course of that t rave 1 thev I
saw two Highway Patrolmen at ~br'
Eighth South and State Street J1
Sims stopped his vehicle next'
to the patrolmen, told them that
his shop had been broken into
that Miss Link 1vas hurt, and thai
he was taking her to the hospita:f
They proceeded to the hospital ·
and Miss Link's injuries 1vere :
treated (T.110). She testified ,
that there was a gash in her sca1(
and a laceration on the nipple ·
of one breast.
A photograuh takr1
some days later of that wo~md ·
was introduced into evidence.
She indicated that her heacl was
stitched (T.113), and that they
got to the hospital about 2:30
a.m.
She testified that Sims
had an injury which she "thought
to be on the left side of his
neck", and that it was red (T.11~1
1

1

She denied at anytime having
given consent to Sims to have
I
sexual intercourse with her, ~di
stated that she was unmarried
and that she had never been marrii
to the Defendant.
1,

I

On cross-examination she
testified that she had initially
gone out with Sims because h~r
number had apparently been vven
to Sims by one Jack Brady, w~om
she had seen at several parties
(T.115).
She stated that she m
could not_ recall any of the pers
who had been at the apartment
-6-

on S Street when Sims picked her
up except to say that she recalled
two persons both of whom were
from Price, Utah. She could
disclose no local persons who
had been at the party (T.117).
She stated that she knew that other
persons at the party were residents
of Salt Lake City but could not
state there names or indicate their
whereabouts (T.119). She denied
any drugs or marajuana were used
at the party. She indicated that
she and Sims had got to llr. Arnold's
apartment at approximately 12 o'clock
midnight and that the other people
who subsequently came to that
apartment arrived at approximately
12:30 a.m. She denied going to
any other place but the apartment
on 2nd West and 33rd South for
the purpose of finding her boyfriend
Cory (T.120). She denied that
she and Sims had discussed having
sexual intercourse in the canyon.
She testified to having had some
beer, wine, and a "white alcohol"
which Sims had given to her during
the course of the evening (T.126).
She was unable to testify to the
exact route that they had driven
while in the truck (T.154). She
testified that there were considerable
"unrecognizeable objects" laying
around the floor of the shop,
and she characterized the shop
as "messy" (T .15 7).
2. The State then called
J.V. Stevenson, M.D., who testifi~d
that he was admitted to the practice
-7-

of medicine in the State of Ut~ 1
specializing in Obstetrics and
Gynecology. He testified that
he did a pelvic examination on
Pauline Link during the early
morning hours of December 5, 1971 I
and found "live sperm in the vaai;,iLI
CT:l62~, ~hich h~ ~estified could i
mainta~n l ts mot1l1 ty for a period!
from eight to twelve hours commonli
and possibly for a period of h.rend
hours. He testified that at the '
time he saw her, her head had been i
bandaged.
0

Dr. Stevenson could not say
that the intercourse which had
been responsible for the deposit
of sperm into the vagina of the
prosecutrix was force ab le (T .170)
and does not recall the presence
of menstrual blood or a tampax
in the prosecutrix. He stated
that had such an item been found
in the pelvic area of the prosecutr
his notes would have revealed it.
He testified that there was no
evidence of tearing or abrasions
of the external genitalia, and
that there was no evidence of ery&
swelling or redness of the vaginal I
tissue (T.172,173). He stated
that had the prosecutrix been
unconscious at the time of penetrat
there would have been a decrease
in the amount of lubricating secret!
in the vagina. He indicated ti1a~
there was no indicating of a· pol1)t,
or a denudation of the skin indic~
a "dry penetration" and that the
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prosecutrix had a "perfectly normal
pelvis" (T.175). He stated that
during the time of the alleged
assault, the prosecutrix was between
the cessation of menstruation and
ovulation.
3. The state then called
Claudia-Boer, the supervisor of
medical records at the L.D.S.
Hospital who read a preliminary
diagnosis of the injuries to Miss
Link, indicating that she had a
five inch laceration in the left
frontal parietal area of the skull
and a further laceration in the
occipital periosteum of the skull.
She further indicated that the
records indicated that Miss Link
had a two centimeter laceration
on the left breast laterally across
the aureola, (T.188). Miss Boer
indicated that there was no evidence
in the record that any sutures
had been taken on the breast,
and that the general characterization
of a laceration as used in the
medical records would be a ::scratch!:
or a "cut" (T.197-8).
4. Miss Link was then recalled
stand for further cross-examination.
I1iss Link stated that the door
may have been left unlocked on
the second trip back to the shop
to change cars, inasmuch as she
did not recall Sims locking the
door (T.204). She stated that prior
to entering the shop on the third
occasion, Sims saicl,"I'm afraid-9-

Y?U ~o first" and that she preceel

'

1

him into the shop as he held her
left hand with his right(T.209).
She stated that she was struck
approxirna tely four to eight t irnes.
She said that when she awoke Sims I
was calling to her from another
part of the shop, and that she
was in a different place in the
shop than she had been when strudj
Sims told her that apparently
,
burglars had been in the shop
!
when they entered and had as saultell
them when caught inside the busine
(T.214). She stated that she
felt that they had been in the
shop approximately thirty to forty
minutes. She stated ~h~t at the
time Sims pulled up next tu the
Highway Patrolmen on the way to
the hospital, Craig gave them
the address to the shop. She
claims that at the time that
occurred she knew that she had
been raped but did not say anythin;
to the officers whatever (T. 218).
She did not recall the exact
1

1

1

ri.,-.,..+..;

l""\"1""\

J...V\....CA.f....J..V.LJ.

"+
V..L
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awoke, but recalled that they
were not up around her waist.
She stated that she wasn't sure
that Craig had either hit her
or raped her at the time they
went to the hospital (T.222).
She stated that Sims visited the
hospital, once or twice, brought
a gift, and that no o~jec~i~n~
were made by her to his visiting
her (T.224). She stated that
Sims visited her once in her home
but that she had refused to see
-10-

l

.

Jllm.

She admitted that she had
previously l1ad sex with her boyfriend
Cory) and denied a statement disclosed
in the hospital report wherein
she had been overheard to say that
she was drunk or on drugs on the
evening of this occurrance (T.238).
5. The State then called
Richard A. Johnson, an officer
with the Salt Lake City Police
Department, who testified that
he got a call indicating a burglary
in progress at approximately 2:20
a.m. December 5, 1970. He approached
the premises at 24 Harvard Avenue
and noticed that the front door
was partially open. He indicated
that he found all the doors and
windows of the shop secure with
the exception of the front door
(T.249), and that he found the
padlock apparently used to secure
the front door in a mud puddle
in front of the shop. He stated
that he s~w thP TIPfPn~~nt 8t the
L.D.S. Hospital at approximately
3:00 a.m. and that he appeared
to be intoxicated and that there
was blood on his person. He indicated
that Sims said his arms hurt and
that he had been struck, but had
not lost consciousness (T.259).
6. Lee Price, also a Salt
Lake Police Officer, indicated
that he saw Sims at the hospital
on the morning of December 5 and
that his knuckles were slightly
-11-

skinned. He said that when he
talked to Miss Link at the hospi
she claimed that she had been
raped but Sims said that it was
"impossible" (T. 266).
Sims tol<l
Officer Price that when they
got to the shop the door was
open and the light was on, that
he had gone in turned off the
light, then went back with Tliss
Link at which time he was struck
Price characterized Sjms as
· '1
excited and drunk at the hospital.\
7.
The State then called
Keith Stauffer, who was at all
relevant tim~s an officer of
the Salt Lake City Police Force,
who stated that he met Sims on
December 7, 1970, at the Salt
Lake City Hall of Justice.
Stauffer indicated that he had
a conversation with Sims prior
to having advised him of his
rights, during which Sims said
that when he and Miss Link had
returned to the shop the door
c
/!2...._...

1

"""Y'\n"T"'\
.c::+"'.:lnrl;'Y\rT
. . . i....\..4.1..a.'-4....L..&..&.fs.,Vt--'"'-'.LJ.
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+hri+
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went inside the business and
that he was struck from behind
and knocked down.
He was also
aware that Miss Link had been
knocked down. He said that he
had been dazed.
He said that
he had heard somebody in the
shop who he assumed to be burglars

---

At this time Officer Stauffe:
advised him of his right to remaH
silent and,the other rights
required by Miranda vs. Arizona
-12-

(T.277-8). Mr. Stauffer then
indicated that his conversation
with Sims "basically came to a
halt," that Sims reiterated that
"she could not have been raped."
"She wasn't out; she wasn't unconscious
for more than a few minutes; and
I was only dazed." At this point
the defense objected to any reference
to this-conversation on the grounds
that Sims, after he had been warned
of his rights under Miranda vs.
Arizona had refused to waive those
rights. The defense at that point
moved for a mistrial based on the
statement of the officer as to
conversation which Sims had made
after his rights had been read.
The objection to the question was
over-ruled and the motion for a
mistrial was denied (T.279).
Stauffer testified that Sims was
aggravated at the conversation
and reached over and ripped the
notes which Stauffer was writing
out of his hand and wadded them
up. Stauffer said that he recovered
the notes.
During the testimony of
Detective Stauffer the defense
made several objections to the
subject-matter of the testimony,
including the fact that Stauffer
continuinally and persistently
volunteered information, refused
to answer the questions responsively
and appeared to_have_a sens~ of
duty about getting his version
of the story in. The manner_ of_ .
his testimony was highly prejudicial
-13-

in the view of the defense and
made a fair trial of the issues
impossible.

i

I

At the conclusion of the prosecu:j
case the defense moved the court
to dismiss the case on the followinsl
grounds:
I
1

1.
That the State had not
I
established, by the introduction
of reasonable evidence,-the corpus
delicti of the crime of rape in
:
that there had been no direct
evidence whatever that the prosecutri'
had even engaged in sexual intercour~
with defendant, let alone been
raped.
1

2.
The fact that there was
insufficient evidence that if
the prosecutrix had been raped
the act had been committed by
the defendant to justify sending
the case to the jury.
Both of said motions were
_r __ _ _ __ -- - . . .
..J ,.... ;J
aenieu ana c11e ueie11::.e JJlUL-c:c:ucu
to present its case which consisted
of testimony and evidence as
follows.
,

•

,

1

~

,

,

~

~

I

A.
Dale Tenney, a Trooper . .
for the Utah Highway Patrol ~estifie 0
that on the evening in question
a red sports car pulled up next
to him while he was in the course
of ticketing a motorist.
In the
car were a man and a women; the
woman was obviously injured and

1

I
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bleeding from the head. At the
time the car pulled up the window
of the sports car \11 as down and
the woman was sitting not more
than two or three feet from the
officer. The female occupant of
the car said nothing to him, but
the male occupant indicated that
his passengar was injured and asked
directions to the hospital. There
was no mentioned made by either
of the occupants of the sports
car of a burglary or a rape, nor
was any explanation as to the
injuries offered.
B. Holly Fife testified that
she was a student nurse working
at the L.D.S. Hospital, and that
she was present when Sims and Niss
Link arrived at the hospital.
She said that Miss Link did not
mention having been raped, and
indicated that she did not want
Sims to leave the room in which
she was being treated. Miss Link
did not make any reference to any
injury to her breast, or the fact
that she had buttons missing from
her jeans (T.253-260) She indicated
that the attendants at the hospital
asked whether or not she had been
raped and she responded that she
did not remember what had happened
(T.264). Mr. Sims stayed in the
hospital most of the night, ~ccompanyed
Miss Link to x-ray, and was in
and out of her presence several
times, during which no strain in
their relationship appeared.
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C.
Lois Burch, a nurse at
the L.D.S. Hospital indicated
that she attended to Niss Link
the next day.
She indicated that
Miss Link was extremely nervous,
and that she entered in Miss Link's
hospital chart the substance of
a conversation which she overheard
in which Miss Link stated, "Guess
what, I was raped 1 as t night"
and that Miss Link, during that
conversation, said something about
"really being on one".
D. Harold Robinson, a Salt
Lake City Police Officer, testified
that he was at the hospital during
the time Sims was there on the
evening in question, that Sims
had blood on his lower forearms
and shirt and appeared to have
no wounds on his hands. He stated
that Sims wrist was swollen and
that he had a large lump on the
back section of his head as well
as considerable puffiness on one
side of his face.
He remarked
to Sims "You will have a good
shiner in the morning", in obvious
reference to the wound on his
face (T.278-281).
E. Mary Arnold, the mother
of Lewis Arnold, testified that
on December 5, 1970, Craig Sims
and Pauline Link arrived at her
home shortly after 12:00 o'clock.
She indicated that her son Lewis
and several other individuals
got home sometime after 1:00,
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and that Miss Link and Mr. Sims
remained there until approximately
1:30 a.m. on December 5, 1970
(T.293).
She further stated that she
saw Craig the next day and that
his hand was bandaged and he had
a black and blue spot on the side
of his face, approximately 2 inches
long which looked like a blow (T.
295). She stated that when she
had observed Miss Link on the
previous evening "You could tell
that Miss Link had been drinking
or taking pills".
F. Lewis Arnold testified
that on the evening of December
5, 1970, he arrived home at approximately
1:10 a.m.; that Miss Link and Mr.
Sims were there when he arrived
and that they left at approximately
1:30 a.m. He stated that Miss
Link appeared "half drunk but not
completely drunk" (T. 304-306).
He stated that he saw Sims the
next day, at which time Sims haJ
a mark from his left eye back to
his left ear approximately 1 inch
1vide, that his hand was bandaged
and his head was black and blue.
G. The defense then called
Preston Sims who testified that
the defendant on the day after
the alleged rape had a bruise on
his temple, and that his wrist
was swollen. He had no scrapes
or visible injuries on his hands.
-17-

He also stated that he had· been
at but not in the defendants shop
on Harvard Avenue at approximately
11:00 p.m. on December 4 , 1970 '
and that the door to the shop
at that time was locked, the lights
were off, and defendant's truck
was inside with the hood up.
He further testified that on the
morning after the alleged rape,
he found a considerable stain
of blood on the steps near the
paint room of the defendants shop
(T.314-16, 329-30).
H. Mrs. Eugene Link, mother
of the prosecutrix, testified
that she saw Sims at the hospital
I
during the early morning of December~
5.
She said that her husband
called the police who investigated
the injury that her daughter had
received.
She further stated
that Sims visited the hospital
in the morning, that he came to
their home twice after Pauline
Link was released from the hospital
and that on the first time he
visited the home he brought a
gift.
1

Due to the recalcitrance of
this witness the defense requested
that she be declared an adverse
witness during further questioning.
The court refused this motion;
whereupon the questioning of this
witness was terminated.
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I. The defense then called
Raymond Brady. The individual
\vho had given Sims 1liss Link's
telephone number. He stated that
he had met Miss Link at a Halloween
Party during October of 1971 that
they had talked together, sm;ked
some marijuana, and that he had
engaged in some reasonably intimate
physical contact with the prosecutrix
having only met her for a few hours
(T.341-342). At this time the
District Attorney objected to the
line of questioning on the grounds
that it was irrelevant and the
court sustained the objection.
The defense, out of the presence
of a jury, argued that in a rape
case the character of the prosecutrix
was in question, that the defense
was entitled to examine into her
propensity to engage in sexual
intercourse, not only to establish
her credibility but to determine
the likelihood that the defendant
had been required to engage in
physical force in order to encourage
the prosecutrix to engage in sexual
intercourse with him.
The defense proffer was that
Mr. Brady's testimony 'vould indicate
that Miss Link was of a character
that would not require the use
of force to get her to submit to
sexual intercourse, all of which
would go to her credibility in
alleging that defendant had raped
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her as well as reveal something
about his state of mind after
having been with her for the
length of time that Sims had
on the evening of December 4.
The court ruled against the
defense and refused to permit
the introduction of that evidence.

J. Mrs. Charlene Patterson
was then called and testified
that she had gone out with Sims
on several occasions socially
and that he had driven her by
to check his shop while on the
dates.
This evidence was introducteu
to rebut the inference laid by
the state that Sims going to
the shop had been mere ploy to
get Miss Link into a physical
circumstance which would be
conducive to the act of rape
(T.343).
K.
Frank Casper, an expert
locksmith was called for the
purpose of establishing that
the kin<l of lock on Sims shop
would be subject to opening very
easily by a burglar, and that
it could be opened either with
a key or with a pry bar wit~out
damaging the lock or rendering
it inoperable (T. 346-350).
L.
The defense then recalled
Pauline Link to the stand.
She
was then carefully interrogated
about her actions on the evening
of December 4.
She did not recall
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any of the route on which she
and Sims had driven after the
party in-search for her boyfriend
(T.354). She testified that the
clothing which had been removed
from her at the hospital was not
given to the Salt Lake City Police
Department·until sometime later
at her home. She stated that the
panties she-had been wearing had
been clean when she put them on
on the evening of December 4. She
did not recall seeing the clothes
at the hospital. She stated that
her clothing had apparently been
taken home in a paper sack, but
that the first time she saw the
clothing worn on the evening in
question the items were piled on
a table not in any kind of container
in the basement of her home (T.367,375-378).
She indicated that she thought the
clothes were in the same condition
at trial as they had been at the
hospital but does not recall having
seen .any blood on her panties when
the clothes were removed from her
at the hospital (T.382-384).
Her answers to most of these
questions were very vague and evasive
culminated by her saying " I don't
remember any answers to the questions
you have been asking" (T.373).
Finally, she stated that ~he ~ad
noticed no irritation or itching
to any part of her body. This question
was put to the prosecutrix due to
information provided by Defendant
and his brother that the shop of
-21-

the defendant was covered with
a fiberglass sanding dust which
when it touches the skin ~auses
inflammation and itching.
M.
The defense then called
the defendant, Loren Craig Sims.
He reiterated a good many of the
events related by the prosecutrix
as they had occurred on the evening
of December 4, 1970 and the early
morning hours of December 5,
1970, but related the following
details and other events which
the defense alleges are significant.
First, Sims indicated that
when he picked up Miss Link at
73 S Street, Miss Link asked him
whether he had any marijuana and
when he replied "no" she suggested
that they get drunk. He stated
that when he picked her up the
individuals at the party, including
the prosecutrix were rolling
and smoking what appeared to be
a marijuana cigarette. He stated
that Miss Link left the premises
at 73 S Street with a marijuana
cigarette and that she and the
hitchhiker they picked up on the
way to the University of Utah
were smoking this cigarette in . .
his truck (T. 85-87).
Sims testified
that his reasons for being concerned.
for the security of his business
was the fact that he had had two
prior burglaries and that he wanted
to be sure the shop was locked
up as was his .habit (T. 90). In
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Hddition to picking up a bottle
of wine at his shop, he picked up
two six packs of 16oz. beer. He
testified that lliss Link had been
drinking wine as well as a mixture
of beer and everclear of which he
had a bottle in his glove compartment.
He said that Miss Link requested
that he stop several times at service
station restrooms (T.93,103). Sims
testified that after they had gone
to the party at Lewis Arnolds, they
left his home at approximately
1:30-1:45 a.m. He indicated that
Miss Link asked him to see if he
could find her boyfriend and they
took a drive from Arnolds house
on Hichigan Avenue and approximately
17th East-to 3rd East and 21st South,
and from there to 33rd South and
2nd West. From there they went
to Kensington Avenue at approximately
13th East from which point they
went to Sim's shop. Sims brother,
Preston, testified that he had taken
a similar drive after the evening
in question and that the elapsed
time,obeying the speed limit, was
approximately 40 minutes. Sims
testified that when they reached
his shop they pulled up and the
lights were out. The door was ajar
and Sims said to liiss Link,"I'll
go in, see whats missing, and call
the Police". As Sims approached,
Miss Link got out of the car ~nd
joined him , taking hold of his
right hand (T.111). He stated that
he did not recall seeing the lock
on the door. As they entered the
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shop Miss Link was slightlf ahead
of him, but he left her and proceeded
toward the rear of the shop to
turn on the light . As he got
to the wall and reached for the
switch he was struck in the head.
He said that everything went
black but he doesn't think that
he lost consciousness (T.113).
Upon regaining his senses he said
that he heard crying or whimpering
and found Miss Link lying on the
floor some distance away near
the door to the paint room. He
stated that during he was aware
of some kind of movement or motion
around him, but was unable to
see anything (T.116). He stated
that Miss Link stated that her
head hurt but that he could not
tell how badly she was injured.
He said that Miss Link asked him
" Did they hurt you bad" and that
he replied that he was allright.
By this time they had walked across
the shop to the door and he could
see in the outside light that
blood was running down her face,
whereupon he told her that he
would take her to the hospital
(T.119-20). He said that the
word burglars was not used during
the conversation and denied that
Miss Link had said she thought
Sims had hit her. He stated that
'
as he saw her regaining consciousness!
she did not do anything with her
!
clothing.
He said that they got
in the car pulled on to State
Str~et, an~ approached the Highway
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Patrolmen for directions to the
hospital. His testimony about
the incident with the patrolman
largely corroborated the statements
of Dale Tenney, with the addition
that questions were asked which
indicated that Miss Link could
easily have gotten out of the
Corvette automobile without
difficulty because of the protection
afforded by the center console
of the automobile from Sims.
Sims testified that when they
reached the hospital he did what
he could to secure help for her
and further indicated that Miss
Link did not want him to leave
her presence (T.125). He testified
that his wrist was stiff and that
he had some blood on his head.
He said that he heard nothing
about an allegation of a sexual
attack for several days (T.126).
At that time, he heard the allegation
from Detective Stauffer. He stated
that he saw Miss Link at the x-ray
division of the hospital and that
he went to see her the next morning
during visiting hours. He did
not talk to Lina but only her
mother, who thanked him for being
so considerate and staying with
Lina the night before (T.128).
He again visited the hospital
on Sunday evening in the company
of several other people, including
Miss Link's boyfriend Cory .
.
He said that he had a conversation
with her at that time during which
she made no mention of any sexual
-25-

attack.
He said he saw her again
at the hospital, gave her a gift,
and engaged in a short conversation '
with her. During that occasion
he denied that she had asked
him to leave or mentioned anything
about a sexual attack (T.130).
The next day he went to her home
at which time Mrs. Link invited
him in. He said that he talked
to Pauline Link from the doorway
but her mother said that she
wasn't dressed and was resting
so he left, intending to come
back later.
He denied that during
this visit anything was said
about a sexual attack.
During
the end of the same week he went
again to the house and Mrs. Link
told him that Pauline was sleeping.
This visit was apparently after
Detective Stauffer had talked
to both Miss Link and Mr. Sims
(T.131).
He stated that on one
of his previous visits he had
had a conversation with Miss
Link about the visits of the
police, in which she said that
she wished " she could get them
to quit bothering her" . She
said she didn't know what they
wanted with her and why they
kept bothering her (T.132). Sims
stated that Miss Link had never
told him that her pants had been
pulled down during the evening
in question (T.153).
At T.156, over defense objection,i
j
the District Attorney required
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Sims to shoH his hands to the
jury and to clench a fist. Also,
on cross-examination, Sims denied
having ever told anyone that he
had raped Miss Link. He corroborated
the testimony of his brother that
when the kind of fiberglass dust
all over the bottom of the shop
comes in contact with the skin,
it causes itching and sometimes
will cause a rash.
The prosecution on rebuttal
called Robert Allan Yockey, who
testified that he had been an
inmate in the Salt Lake County
Jail during a considerable period
of time when Sims was incarcerated
there awaiting trial. In response
to patently leading questions,
permitted by the court over objection,
he affirmed that Sims had told
him that he took Miss Link to
his shop, that he knocked her
unconscious, and that during the
time she was unconscious he raped
her; that after he raped her he
laid down beside her and pretended
that they had been assaulted by
burglars.
The special attention of
.
.
the court is called to the cross-exam1nat1on
of this witness commencing at
T.179 during which this witness
all b~t destroyed any claim that
he might have that his testimony
was credible.He said that Sims
told him that he had called the
police immediately after he noticed
-27-

the girl lying there with the
bottom of her clothes off denied
Sims ever said he took he; to
the hospital and indicated that
Sims had said he had set up the
door to look like a buralarly
b
'
apparently before he and the girl
returned to the shop.
He indicated
that Sims said he had sprained
his ankle during the course of
the rape and indicated that Sims
may have said that the girl got
a broken leg during the attack
(T.183).
He indicated that he
had not said anything to anybody
about this conversation for a
considerable period of time after
the conversation had occurred
(T.184-185).
At T.189 Yockey testified
as to the substance of the conversatid
he had with Jay Edmonds,most of
which was subsequently rebutted
by the testimony of Jay Edmonds
(T.207).
On surrebuttal the defense
called Mark Richmond, also an
inmate in the Salt.Lake County
Jail during the tiilie in which
the alleged incriminating statements•
related by Yockey were supposed
·
to have been made by Sims.
Richmond
testified that he had been one
cell· away from Sims during the
period in question and that as
a habit he never went to sleep
before 2:00 o'clock a.m. because
he had had a special 1 igh t installed
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in his cell permitting him to
read late into the night. He
testified that had such a conversation
as related by Yockey and Sims
occurred, he would have heard
it and to his knowledge there
had never been anything said by
Sims comporting to the substance
of the conversation related by
Yockey.
Also on surrebuttal, the
defense called Gary Phelps, who
had been an inmate of the Salt
Lake County Jail during the same
period of time. He testified that
Sims had told him about the affair,
indicated that he and Miss Link
had been beat up and that he took
her to the hospital, and implied
that the police were trying to
make something up about what
happened during the period when
Miss Link was knocked out (T.156).
He said that Sims had never told
him or anybody else in his hearing
that he had raped or assaulted
Miss Link. He also testified
that Yockey had asked him whether
"some people can get released
from jail if they made a deal
if they tell about something
another person has done" and that
a jailor had said that if you
want to tell on somebody he could
put him in touch with the people
to tell (T.158). He also stated
that during this conversation
Yockey had mentioned the name
of Craig Sims. Phelps further

stated that he was with Yockey
every night during the period
i~ question and that during that
time Yockey had not had any conversat 1
with Sims of the substance related
to the court by Yockey (T.237).
After argument, the jury was
charged and retired to deliberate.
The jury returned at 6:58 p.m.
and found the defendant guilty
of the crime of rape as charged
in the information.
The defense excepted to of
the courts instructions as shall
be hereinafter further setforth
(T.242).
ARGm.IENT
I

THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH DEFENDAITT
WAS CONVICTED IS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT FOR TWO
REASONS:
A. THE EVIDENCE OF THE CORPUS
DELICTI OF THE CRIME· OF RAPE IS
INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE
FACT OF THE CRIME BEYOND A REASONABLl
DOUBT.
Appellant asserts that the~e
are certain evidentiary anomalies
both in the testimony of the
prosecutrix and others which
require recognition of a reasonable
doubt that the crime of rape was
-30-
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committed on the evening of December
4th· or the early morning of December
5, 1970 against Pauline Link.
First is a serious problem
which arises out of the time elements
as they were stated by the witnesses
at trial. Lewis Arnold, his mother
Mary Arnold, Mrs. Twelves, and
Craig Sims, all testified that
Sims and Miss Link left the home
of Lewis Arnold sometime between
1:25 and 1:35 a.m. on the morning
of December 5, 1970. The uncontroverted
testimony of Trooper Dale Tenney
indicated that Sims flagged him
down at approximately 8th South
and State Street at 2:05 a.m. on
December 5, 1970, a period of at
most 40 minutes after the defendant
and Miss Link had left the home
of Mr. Arnold. Miss Link acknowledged
that she and Sims had driven to
33rd South and West Temple in an
effort to find Miss Link's boyfriend
in that interim. Sims testified
that they had stopped at 21st South
and 3rd East, then gone to 33rd
South and West Temple, and then
returned to somewhere in the neighborhood
of Kensington Avenue and 13th East
also during the same period of
time before they returned to his
shop. Sims brother testified that
at the speed limit, this d~ive .
took almost 40 minutes. Miss Link
was carefully cross -examined about
these other stops, but did not
recall them. Attention is called
to the vagueness of her testimony
-31-

and her inability to even recall
the routes they travelled
on that evening, all of which can
only support the conclusion that
her recollection is not nearly
so sound as Sims'. The long and
short of this is that if there
were only 40 minutes available
from the time Miss· Link and Sims
left Mr. Arnold's house and the
time they flagged over Trooper
Tenney, and they had spent 40
minutes driving around, there
would have been no time left during
that interim for Sims- to accomplish
a forceable rape upon Miss Link.
Her testimony that she was knocked
unconscious for 30 or 40 minutes
is obviously untenable in light
of this time factor.
Even so,
it would appear impossible for
Sims to have hit Miss Link in
the head, removed her trousers
and underpants, committed forceable
rape on her, put her underpants
and trousers on and pulled them
partially up, feigned being unconscio~1
himself, antl got out of the sh?P
in time to meet the 2:05 deadline
I
testified to by Officer Tenney.
1
[

In light of all the foregoing,
there is certain a reasonable
doubt that during that period
of time any act of intercourse
.
was accomplished with the prosecutnx
by the defendant.
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Further attention is called
to the allegations of Mr. Sims
regarding the conduct of the
prosecutrix at the time he picked
her up at the party at 73 S Street.
He indicated unequivocally that
Miss Link was smoking marijuana
and during the course of the
evening she became somewhat drunk.
Her singular inability to come
up with any corroboration whatever
for her portion of the story
tends to cast substantial doubt
about its veracity. Her refusual
to disclose the names of any
persons at the party is highly
significant, particularly in light
of the fact that the form of the
questions and her answers indicate
that she had to know their names.
Her inability to recall the time
sequence or the routes driven
by she and the defendant so as
to establish the time sequence
more adequately tends to indicate
either a drunkeness which exceeds
that demonstrated by the record
or a refusal to come forward with
the whole tr~th. Her vagueness
in answering questions as to the
sequence of events at the hospital
is significant. At bottom, the
prosecutrix came forth with no
direct evidence whatever that
Sims had committed the crime of
rape on her, ?r that such ~ crime
iv as ever comm1 tted.
She simply
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permitted, by her refusal to
testify and make available evidence
of the true facts, a theory of
the state based wholly on circums tanfr
evidence, none of which, by reason
1
of her refusal to disclose the
facts, was subject to corroboration
to go to the jury and result in
, ·
a verdict of guilty.
There is
no justification permitting such
an unsupported theory of guilt,
together with a refusal to clarify
those portions of the theory which
were subject to easy corroboration,
to result in the imprisonment
of the appellant.
1

A third inconsistency in the
testimony is the assertion of
the prosecutrix that she was,
on December 5, 1970, in the 6th
day of menstruation, and that
she was wearing a tampax on that
evening.
The testimony of Dr.
Stevenson was that he did not
recall the presence of menstrual
blood or a tampax in the prosecutrix
(T.170), and that had such been
the case he would have made notes
of it. He further testified that
during a period of unconsciousness
there would be a decrease in the
amount of vaginal lubrication
.
which would tend to cause a denudation
or polishing of the skin upon
penetration.
No such evidence
was found by the doctor.
On the
contrary he testified that she
had a "perfectly normal pelvis"
(T.175). This conflict i~ the
testimony raises a question as
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to the motive of Miss Link in
lying about such inconsequential
factors. Defendant alleges that
the most logical explanation for
the conflict is that Miss Link
had in fact engaged in sexual
intercourse with somebody other
than the defendant within a day
or two of the 5th of December
1970, and that she desired to
hide that fact from the jury and
the spectators in the courtroom,
including her parents.
Of further significance
is the recalcitrance of the prosecutrix
to disclose the name or whereabouts
of her boyfriend "Cory". She
refused to disclose his identity
to the defense prior to trial,
and only after she was ordered
to do so by the court did she
disclose his identity at trial.
At this point, it was too late
to locate this man, who the defense
asserts is the most likely person
to corroborate. her statement that
she had had no intercourse within
a period of 24 hours. Her recalcitrance
to supply this information can
only lead to the conclusion that
she was afraid his testimony would
contradict hers with the result
that the corpus delicti of the
crime of rape would remain unproven.
The long and short of this
is that the only evidence of rape
is the evidence that live sperm
was found in the vagina of the
prosecutrix on the morning of
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December 5, 1970, coupled with
her testimony that she had not
engaged in sexual intercourse
within a period of 24 hours of
the time of the pelvic examination.
Given the inconsistencies in her
i
testimony and her refusal to
disclose facts which would tend
,
to ~hr<?w light on those inconsistenciel
a finding that the crime of rape
occurred here does not comport
I
with the requirements of due
I
process as set forth in the
:
Fourteenth Amendment to the Cons ti tutii:
of the United States.
The finding
is wholly circumstantial and
obviously ignores the quality
of the testimony on which it is
based.
j

B. THE EVIDENCE TENDING TO
ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANT COl'vlMITTED
THE CRIME OF RAPE, IF INDEED IT
OCCURRED, IS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN A VERDICT OF GUILTY.
In addition to the facts stated
in part A above indicating that
the crime itself was not committed,
the following further items create
a "reasonable doubt" under the
instructions of the court, that
defendant committed the crime.
1.
The actions of the appellant
during the course of the evening
after the alleged rape occurred
do not demonstrate any consciousness
of guilt whatev~r, but indicate
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that he had no consciousness whatever
that any crime beside an assault
by unknown assailants had occurred
against he and the prosecutrix.
First is his action immediately
after removing the prosecutrix
from his shop and putting her in
the car. The proposition that
a man who had just forceably raped
a woman would pull up next to a
Highway Patrolman on a public
street, with his victim sitting
in a car constructed in a manner
which would prohibit him from
stopping her if she wanted to get
out, so that she was immediately
adjacent to an Officer of the Law,
and ask directions to the hospital
is utterly preposterous. The last
thing that a rapist would do with
his victim is take her to the
police. Of further significance
is the fact that even though Miss
Link had every opportunity to
disclose her knowledge of the crime
of rape or her suspicions that
Sims had assaulted her one way
or another to the trooper, and
that she failed to do so, indicates
that the proposition of a forceable
rape had crossed neither of their
minds at a point some moments after
they left the shop. It is certainly
inconceivable that a woman who
had just been raped in the manner
that Miss Link is alleged to have
been raped, would sit idly by,
saying nothing, two feet from a
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policeman, while still in the
company of her assailant.
If
she had been conscious of being
raped, and had any suspicion
that Sims had done it, one would
suppose her fears about the
disposition he would make of
her due to that knowledue
would
b
compel her to make some effort
to get away from him or disclose
her suspicions.
All of this
lends credence to the propositions
set forth by the defense that
the allegation of rape did not
originate in the mind of Miss
Link, but was implanted there
by the hospital personnel and
officers and permitted to grow
by her so that she could avoid
disclosure that she had committed
sexual intercourse with her
boyfriend.
This proposition
is further strengthened by the
fact that she said not word
one about rape until after the
early morning hours of the 5th
when Dr. Stevenson approached
her and requested permission
to perform a pelvic examination
upon her.
Her actions are consistent
with the assertion but that she
had had sexual intercourse with
her boyfriend within the period
immediately prior to her admittance
to the hospital, and that she
had no concern about that fact
until the proposition of rape
was raised by hospital personnel.
When informed that they wanted
her to undergo a pelvic examination
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which she knew would disclose that
she had had sexual intercourse
'
she , though not making any statements
directly implicating the defendant
merely permitted the assumption
'
that Sims was guilty of the crime
to grow. She likely assumed that
no case could be made against the
defendant by reason of the truth
of his allegations about the attack
having originated with unknown
assailants, which would permit
her to not do anything tc rebut
the train of thought of the police
on the assumption that in no event
would it cause harm to the defendant.
All of the fore going is also supported
by the proposition that she did
' not remonstrate against Sims presence
, with her at the hospital, and her
lack of hostility towards him on
the several subsequent visits
which he paid to her both at home
and at the hospital. The proposition
that a woman who had any consciousness
or belief that a man had forceably
raped her would permit him to visit
, 1vi th her both in the hospital and
in her home is preposterous.

1

Another factual problem is
raised by her refusal to specify
what she meant that her pants were
11
down" . If she knew that they
were down she must have known how
far they were down when she pulled
them up. To think that she could
. state that they were down over
her buttocks but not go any further,
strikes the writer as ridiculous.

1
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Furthermore, the testimony of
Sims and his brother that the
shop_was covered with a layer
of fiberglass dust which causes
a severe reaction to the skin
would indicate that her pants
were not down sufficiently to
permit contact with her bare skin
to the floor~
Otherwise she would
have been conscious at least of
some itching.
No such testimony
is found in the record.
Of further significance is
the fact that the prosecutrix
said that some buttons were off
her pants.
No buttons were found
in the shop or in the vehicle
of the defendant.
This raises
a questions as to where the items,
if they were removed from the
prosecutrix during the course
of an attack, went.
The inadequate
handling of her clothing, as shall
be hereinafter setforth, raises
substantial question about the
probative value of her testimony
that buttons were missing from
her trousers.
The defense asserts that Miss
.
Link's defensiveness and refusal
. '
to say anything directly incr~minatin~
about Sims arises from her guilty.
knowledge that the whole prosecut1~
arose out of her permitting an
inference to arise which was not
true.
I~ Sims. had struck ~er .· . d
six or eight times as she Lest1f1e '
the likelihood that she would
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have turned at least to be conscious
of the fact that he struck her is
so great as to render her refusal
to implicate him directly a severe
challenge to her credibility.
The facts indicate that we simply
have here a girl who solved a personal
problem by permitting others to
weave a false inference from perverted
facts which has now resulted in
the conviction of the appellant.
Taken as a whole, Sims'
recollections as to the events of
that evening are entirely more
consistent with the corroborated
facts than Miss Links', and are
certainly so pursuasive as to create,
as a matter of law, a reasonable
doubt both about the corpus delicti
of the offense and Sims implication
in it.
Although the courts are generally
reticent to overturn the facts found
by juries, such action is the duty
of courts when it is apparent that
the objective standards contained in
the instructions to the jury have
not been complied with in the fact
finding process. See e.g., United
States· vs. Corso, 439 F.2d 956. In
the instant case, the court instructed
the jury as fallows:
17. To warrant you in
convictina the defendant, the evidence
must to y~ur minds, exclude every
reasonable hypothesis other than that
of the guilt of the defendant.
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That is to say if after an eritire
cons ider~tion ~nd comparison of ~111
the testimony in the case, you ca;:l-,
reasonably explain the· facts aiven
in evidence on- any reasonablebground
other than the guilt- of the defendant
you should acquit him. (emphasis
'
added)
In fact, the Arizona Supreme Court
has held that failure to give an
"al te rna ti ve- reason ab le hypothesis"
instruction is error. State vs.
Valenzuela, 425 P.2d 127. The Flori~
Supreme Court in Reynolds· vs. State,
186 So.2d 315, has said that
"where the evidence is wholly
circumstantial and does not exclude
all reasonable inferences of
innocence it is· insufficient 11 •
The Utah Supreme Court in State
vs. Gutheil, 98 U. 205, 98 P. 2d
9 4 3 ' said "A criminal case requires
.
proof of each element of the crime
by evidence that convinces one
beyond a reasonable doubt of the
existence of each such element.
In this case, neither the corpus
delicti of the crime nor the
defendants' guilt thereof were
supported by evidence meeting th~
criteria set forth in the foregoing
cases.
.

To the instant· case· the following
language quoted from U.S. vs.
Buflino,, 285 F.2d 408, (CA 2
1960) is applicable.
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A prosecution framed on such
a doubtful basis should never
lnve been initiated or allowed
to proceed so far. For in
America we still respect
the dignity of the individual
anl even an unsavory character
is not to be imprisoned except
on definite proof of a specific
crime. And nothing in criminal
law administration suggests
or justifies sharp relaxation
of traditional standards.
In this case the court property
instructed the jury as follows:
20. You are instructed that
the charge of rape, is in
its nature, a most heinous
on~ likely to create a strong
prejudice against the accused.
It is a charge easy to make
and hard to disprove
To permit one to be imprisoned
when the above quoted instruction
is so squarely in point, upon a
mishmash of such uncorroborated,
confusing, weak, inferential, and
contradictory circumstantial evidence
as that set forth in this case
violates the very fundamentals of
the precepts of fairness upon which
our judicial system is based, and
should therefore not be permitted
to go unchecked. To permit this
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verdict to stand under the
foregoing circumstances
constitutes a violation of the
fundamentals of due process
insured by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States.
II

THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT
TO GRANT DEFENDAl~TS MOTION FOR
CHANGE OF VENUE WAS REVERSABLE
ERROR.
Courts have long recognized
an internal conflict in both the
language of the Sixth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United
States and Article 1 Section 12
of the Constitution of the State
of Utah, pro vi ding that in criminal
prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to a trial by
an impartial jury in the County
and District in which the offense
is alleged to have been committed,
by reason of the fact that sometimes
local prejudice existing in that
District makes an impartial trial
impossible.
In recognition of
this conflict the legislature
of the State of Utah has provided
for the removal of criminal actions
upon the ground that a fair and
impartial trial cannot be h~ld
in the County where the action
is pending.
Section 77-26-1,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. In
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light of this problem appellant
urges this court to reasses its
recent reluctance to overturn
District Court refusals to grant
defense motion for change of
venue and to revert to the position
stated by this court through
Justice Wade in State v. BeBee,
110 Utah 484,175 P.2d 478:
... it certainly would not
have been unfair for the
court to have granted a
change of venue, and we
are in opinion that it
would have been better if
the trial court had granted
the change under the circumstances
of this case for their were
inflammatory news comments ...
(175 P.2d 481).
This language raises what
may be the most pursuasive argument
in favor of granting defense motions
for change of venue; that is that
in a criminal case, the defendant
ought to be entitled to the fairest
possible trial which can be reasonably
given to him, for to do less
is to deny him the due process
of law to which he is entitled.
The Supreme Court has spoken
several times on the propriety
of granting defense motions for
change of venue: Irving v. Dowd, _
366 U.S. 717,
Shepherd v. MaX\vell
384 U.S. 344, Marshall v. U.S.
360 U.S. 310.
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Perhaps the best statement
of the Supreme Courts'
position
is found in Irving v. Dowd, supra.
Here, the buildup of prejudice
is clear and convincing.
An examination of the then
current community pattern
of thought as indicated by
the popular news media is
singularly revealing ... A
reading of the 46 exhibits
which petitioner attached
to his motion indicates that
a barrage of newspaper headlines,
articles, cartoons and pictures
was unleashed against him
during the six or seven months
preceeding his trial.
The
motion further alleges that
the newspapers in which the
stories appeared were delivered
regularly to approximately
95% of the residences in Gibson
County .•. These stories reveal
the details of his background,
including a reference to crimes
committed when a juvenile ....
It cannot be gainsayed
that the force of this adverse
publicity caused a sustained
excitement and fostered a
strong prejudice among the
people of Gibson County.
An examination of the press
notations submitted upon the
records of this case together with
those about the same defendant in a

-46-

case closely related in time and
substance to the instant case,
which case is presently before
this court as Docket No.12244
will reveal the same reflection
of public sentiment. Of particular
impact are editorial statements
made by local papers about not
only this defendant but the general
system of court procedure which
resulted in his being granted a
new trial for the crime of murder.
When community prejudice is as
high as that reflected in this
editorial, to permit trial in the
jurisdiction where the ~bject press
releases have the greatest currency
is to deny defendant the "best
trial which can reasonably be given
to him", and to violate the due
processes of the law as they are
guaranteed to him to by Constitution
of the United States.
The following are State
Court cases containing what appellant
asserts to be a more appropriate
~pellate posture on this question.
State v. BeBee, supra; Forsythe
v. St ate , 410 Ohio 2 d 10 4 , 2 3 0 N • E •
2d 611; Juelich v. U.S., 214 F.2d
950 (CA7, 1954); State v. Canada,
48 Iowa 440, 164 N. W. 794; State
~Thompson, 226 Minn. 385,123
N.\V. 378; State v. Bruman, 127
llont.579, 269 P.2d 796; People
v. Leadeche; 258 N. W. 115; People
v. Fernadez, 89 N.W. 2d 421; Rogers
Qtate, 236 S.W. 2d 141.
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Particular attention is called
to the language of Forsythe ,
supra where in the Supreme Court
of Ohio stated:
Where there is reasonable
likelihood that prejudicial
news prior to trial will
prevent fair trial, and postponing
the trial will not remove
the threat, the Judge should
remove the case to another
County not so permeated with
publicity (emphasis added).
The fact that the articles
published about Sims during 1971,
all related him to the offense
of felony murder as well as the
offense charged in the instant
case simply adds weight to his
claim that a removal of the trial
should have been granted.
The
temper of the community about
these cases was simply not conducive
to the conduct of a fair trial.
The evidence, inconclusive as
it may be, that certain jurors
knew about the case prior to their
sitting as jurors in the trial
further demonstrates the' proposition
that the public temper about these
actions may well have been so
great as to vitiate the complete
integrity of the jury and permit
it to draw inferences from the
press which are impermissable
under our system of jurisprudence.
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By reason of the foregoing
appellant asserts that his conviction
should be reversed, and if remanded
for new trial, that said cause
should be held in a County other
than Salt Lake County.

III
THE REFUSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT
TO GRANT DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DEPOSE
THE PROSECUTING WITNESS PRIOR TO
TRIAL DENIED DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS
OF LAW.
Pivotal to the defense of the
instant case was complete exploration
of the evidence of the corpus
delicti of the crime. After the
preliminary hearing the defense,
through investigative work, determined
that Miss Link had a boyfriend
with whom, according to the evidence
turned up in investigation, the
prosecuting witness may well have
regularly engaged in sexual intercourse.
At the time of preliminary hearing,
as well as at trial, the State's
evidence of the fact of the crime
of rape depended upon the finding
of live sperm inside of the prosecuting
Witness on the morning of December
S, 1971 coupled with her denial
that she had had sexual intercourse
within the 24 hour period immediately
prior to the pelvic examination.
The court found this evidence
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sufficient to send the case to
the jury, which returned a verdict
of guilty.
The difficulty with
the whole series of events is
that the defense was denied the
opportunity to investigate the
credibility of the statement of
the prosecuting witness that she
had not engaged in sexual intercourse
within 24 hours prior to the time
of her pelvic examination by Dr.
Stevenson by obtaining from her
the identity of her boyfriend,whom
the defense viewed to be the most
likely candidate to throw additional
light on her statement.
In light of this problem,
and in light of two refusals of
the prosecuting witness to conduct
a rational discussion with defense
counsel about anything to do with
the case, the defense by proper
motion moved the court to order
a deposition of the prosecuting
witness, in the presence of the
County Attorney, so this matter
could be more fully explored and
so that an opportunity would be
had to determine the identity
of Miss Link's boyfriend.
This motion, filed on May
18, 1971 was denied, with the
result that the identity of the
boyfriend of the prosecuting
'
witness was not learned by the
defense until the time of trial,
at which it was far too late to
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locate him in time to obtain the
answers to the questions desired
to be put to him.
Of further significance is
the fact that the prosecuting
witness, in declining to discuss
the case with defense counsel,
indicated that the reason she
refused to hold such a discussion
was that she had been instructed
not to discuss the case with the
defense by Keith Stauffer, then
an Officer of the Salt Lake City
Police Department. The result
of this course of events is that
the defense was denied access
to key evidence which it is believed
by the defendant would have rebutted
the evidence adduced by the State
to establish the corpus delicti
of the crime for which appellant
was convicted.
There has been an evolution
in the la1v relative to the requirement
that prosecuters make available
to the defense all evidence known
by the prosecuter which is material
to any case. The Supreme Court
initially held, in a series of
decisions represented by Napue
.'.'2_. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 3 L.Ed
2rid 1217, 79 S. Ct. 1173, that
the knowing use of false tes tirnony
by a prose cuter who, after the
testimony is known to be false
permits it to go uncorrected is
a violation of the due process
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of the law (1959).
This holding
was an extention of a rule first
enunciated in Mooney vs. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103 in which the Supreme
Court reversed for a failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence:
"The same result obtains when
the State, although not soliciting
false evidence, allows it to go
uncorrected when it appears."
'

The next significant statement
and expansion of this rule is
found in Brady vs. Maryland ,
373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed. 2nd 215,
83 S. Ct. 1194 in which the Supreme
Court said:
We now hold that the supression
of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence
is material either to guilt
or punishment, irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecution.
Society wins not only when
the guilty are convicted but
when criminal trials are fair;
our system of the administration
of justice suffers when any
- .
accused is treated unfairly(emphasi:
added) .
This rule has been enunciated
by several State Courts, represenati"
of which is the Supreme Court
of Missouri in the case of State
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vs. Thompson, 396 S.W. 2d 297 (1965)

Tu which the Missouri Court said:

"Various courts have held
that the suppression of (or
failure to disclose) evidence
in the possession or control
of the prosecution which is
favorable to defendant and
which might be pursuasive
to a jury, constitues such
a fundamental unfairness
as to invalidate a conviction
(emphasis added).
This line of cases is particularly
significant in this prosecution because,
as the court instructed the jury in
Instruction No. 20:
'
You are instructed that the
charge of rape, is in its
nature, a most heinous one,
likely to create a strong
prejudice against the accused.
It is a charge easy to make
and hard to disprove.
On this account you should
bear in mind the difficulty
of defenditig against such
a charge and consider most
carefully all of the evidence
and instructions given in
making up your verdict.
The extrodinarily fragmentary
and tenuous nature of the circumstantial
evidence adduced by the State to
prove the corpus delicti of the
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crime of rape in this case accents
the need to put all relevant cviJ2ncc
before the jury.-- As stated ahove
there was no direct evidence that '
anybody had raped Pauline Link,
let alone the defendant, and the
only evidence to indicate that
proposition was the finding by
Dr. Stevenson of live sperm in
the vagina of the prosecuting
witness on the morning of December
5 together with her denial that
she had had sexual intercourse
within the 24 hour immediately
preceeding that examination. There
is no question that the sperm was
found, but prior to trial the
defense uncovered evidence which
would have permitted either corroboratio:
or contradiction of Miss Link's
statement that she had not had
intercourse within the 24 hours
immediately proceeding the morning
of December 5.
In light of the
difficulty of defending against
I
the charge of rape as expressed
by the court in its Instruction
No. 20, the placement of any impediment
to a full investigation of the
factual allegations set forth to
substantiate the charge, whether
made by the investigating officers,
the prosecution, or the court,
constitutes such a fundamental
unfairness in the administration
of justice that it runs afoul of
the thrust of the language of the
Supreme Court of the United States
in Brady vs. Maryland, supra.

In this case there is no
allegation of affirmative misconduct
by the prosecuting attorneys,
but what is alleged is an adoption
by them, and a refusal to cooperate
in the supression of a statement
made by the investigating officer
to the prosecuting witness which
made it impossible for the defense
to investigate the credibility
of her key statement in this case.
When the court failed to remedy
that default, the defendant was
denied the very substance of an
appropriate defense to this charge
which denied him fundamental due
process of the law.
More-particularly in point
on pre-trial supression of testimony
is the case of Gregory vs. United
States, 369 F.2nd 185 where the
court of appeals for the circuit
stated:
The prosecutor's advice to
prospective witnesses that
they not speak to anyone
about the case unless he
was present was an improper
and unreasonable interference
with defendants equal right
to interview witnesses.
The court of appeals reversed
Gregory's conviction by reason
of that interference. Of further
significance is the case of Howard
~ The State, 244 N.E.2nd 127

_r:;r:;_

wherein the Supreme Court of
Indiana reversed a conviction
of murder in the first degree,
and on appeal held that the trial
court's ruling denying defense
motions for discovery constituted
reversable error. Prior to trial
the defendant had petitioned
the court for permission to take
depositions of two police officers
whose names had been given by
the prosecuter as prospective
witnesses.
Emphasizing that
a criminal prosecution is not
a game but rather a system designed
to discover the truth, the Indiana
Court reversed the judgment of
conviction because in the opinion
of the court the defendant was
entitled to examine before trial
individuals whom the prosecuter
had indicated would be witnesses
for the State.
The holdings of those two
cases are strong pursuasive
authority, particularly given
the context and facts of the
instant case, that appellants
conviction should be reversed
by reason of an unwarranted
and unfair interference with
his right to investigate the
facts upon which the State's
case rests.
To have denied
him access to the fundamantal
facts of the case constitutes
such a denial of due process
that it is a patent violation
of the rights secured to him
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the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United
States.

by

VI
THE INTRODUCTION OF CLOTHING
OF THE PROSECUTRIX ALLEGEDLY WORN
ON THE EVENING OF THE CRB1E WAS
REVERS.ALBE ERROR.
Plaintiff's Exhibits 6-10
were comprised of a pair of white
panties, trousers, coat, shirt,
and a scarf alleged to have been
worn by the prosecutrix on the
evening of December 4, 1970, and
the morning of December 5, 1970.
When introduced at the trial the
white panties bore dirt smudges
and blood stains, and the outer
garments were disheveled, dirty,
and dusty. Miss Link testified
that as to Exhibit 8 the coat,
No. 9 the shirt, No. 10 the scarf,
No. 6 the panties, and No. 7 the
trousers, they were "clean" when
she put them on and not in the
same condition when introduced
at the trial (T. 105-108). As to
the coat and pants the defense
levied no objections. As to the
shirt, scarf and panties, the
defense objected to the admissibility
of the evidence on the ground of
immaterialily. Though the exact
foundation of the allegation of
immateriality was not stated, that
objection was taken by reason of
the fact that with the chain of
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evidence established at the time
of marking and submission into
evidence the prosecution had not
established that the change in
the clothing had been effected
during the course of a crime.
The prosecution failed to establish
that relationship satisfactorily
through almost the whole trial.
Finally the defense asked relevant
questions with reference to the
matter commencing at T. 433 and
continuing through T. 439. That
colloquy comprised both of direct
and cross-examination follows:
BY MR. BARBER:

Q Now with reference, Pauline,

to State's Exhibit No. 6,
what was -- when was the last
time you examined these panties
in detail in the area of the
crotch prior to getting to
the hospital?
A

I didn't.

Q You didn't?

So, would
it be safe to say, then,
particularly with reference
to these red stains, that
it is not necessarily so that
those happened after midnight
of that
A

Yes, it did happen after.

Q And how do you knmv that?
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-A Because I wasn't flowing
hard enough that that would
happen.

Q But when was the last
time you had checked?

A

0:1, I don't remember.

Q l1ight it have been early
that morning?

A

No.

Q No? But you don't -you said you didn't recall
when you changed, so how
do you know it wasn't early
in the morning?
A It was probably in the
evening when I put them on.

Q It was probably in the

evening? Do you recall having
done that?

A

Yes.

Q

When was that?

A

In the evening.

Q
A

Well, by "in the evening, II Around five, six, seven.

Q Five, six, seven?
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You said that those pants
remained in your home for
some period between the time
you were in the hospital and
the time that the officer
picked them up, is that
correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Where were they during
that period?

A

I don't know.

Q Would it be safe to assume

from the course -- general
course of events in your home
that those pants would have
been in a laundry area? · ·
A

No.

Q

No? You would put those
in a drawer or something?

A

They were in a paper bag.

Q They were in a paper bag?
And where did the paper bag
come from?
A

From the hospital.

Q

And how -- how do you
know those pants were in that
paper bag all that time?
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A Well, who is going to take
them out?
Q Oh, I really don't know,
Miss Link, but let me ask
you the questions.

You said that you didn't
sec them when they were brought
back from the hospital, isn't
that correct?

A That's right.
And the next time you saw
them was when Detective Stauffer
came by?

Q

A

Yes.

Q And do you know -- but
you said when you first saw
them after they got home,
they were in a paper bag?
A Yes.

Q Of course, these other

articles of clothing were
in the paper bag too, weren't
they? (Indicating.)

A

No.

Q No?
bag?

How big was the paper
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A

What paper bag?

Q The paper bag that the
clothes were in?

A

All of them?

Q Well, that's what I asked
you, were they all in a paper
bag?
A I said I didn't even think
they were in a bag at all.

Q Where were the clothes
when you first saw them?
A They were sitting on a
table.
(In di ca ting.)

Q

This table here?

A

No.

Q

Which table?

A

A table in my house.

Were they in any container
at that time?

Q

A I don't remember them being
in anything.

Q You don't. Do you know
whether they were returned
to your home in a container?
A

No, I don't know that
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either.
Q So do you know whether
or not they were in a container
from the time that you got
them home and the time you
first saw them on the table?

A

I don' t knmv.

Q They may not have been

in a container or they may
have been in a container?
A

That's right.

Q Do you know which part
of the house they were kept
in?

A I think I smv them down
in the basement.

Q Down in the basement?
What portion of the basement?
Was it in a recreation, rumpus
room or a laundry room or
garage, or what?
A

It's sort of a T.V. room.

Q A T.V. room?
Were they in a container there?
A I don't remember of them
being in one.
Q

Ever?

A

No.
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Q They were just loose?
A

Yes.

Q All right. Do you know
whether they were ever in
any other area of your home
during that period?
A

I don't know.

Q You don't know. Do you
know whether they were delivered
to your home in a vehicle?
A

In a

Q In a vehicle.
A Oh, I don't know how they
were gotten home.

Q All right. That's the

question. So you don't know
whether they got to your
home in a vehicle, right?
A No, I don't.
they were.

I assume

Q. You assume that. Now,
Miss Link, when you were in
the hospital, how long were
you in the hospital before
you had a bath?
A

One day.

Q That would have been the
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next day?
A

Saturday sometime.

Q DurinB that day, did you
recall experiencing any
itching or rash of any sort
on any part of your body?

A

No.

Q And particularly with
reference to your buttocks
and your thighs in the back,
did you notice any itching
of any kind there?

A

No.

q

Or did you notice any
abrasions of any sort on
that area of the body?

A

No, I don't remember.

Q No pain of any sort?
A

I don't remember any.

Q You are not conscious

of anything at all with
reference to that area that
would be out of the ordinary?
Well, if so, I don't
remember.

A

Q All right. Do you know
when you put on this pair
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of panties that's here as
State's Exhibit 6? (Indicating.)
A .r told you that evening,
Friday evening, and you just
asked me.

Q I must have missed that.

I thought~ I asked you when
you checked to determine they
weren't stained and you said
that.

A That's when I put them
on.

Q You put them on at the
same time. And I presume they
had been freshly laundered
prior to that?
A.. Yes

Q You don't know what happened
after you took them off to the
time you saw them at home?

A They were sitting in a
paper bag.That's all I know.

Q Just one further brief
question. You state that the
last time that you had intercourse 1
was approximately a week prior
to December 5th, is that
correct?
A

That's right.

Q Was that with your steady
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boyfriend?
A Yes.

Q Did you have intercourse
reqularly with Cory or
MR. BANKS:

Objection --

THE COURT:

Sustained.

MR. BANKS:

- - Your Honor.

Q And you are absolutely

certain that you did not
have intercourse within two
days of December 5th?

A Within a week.
MR BARBER: No further questions
at this time.
RECROSS EXAfIINATION
BY MR. BANKS:

Q Let's take these items

one at a time. (Indicating.)

This one you saw in the home
was where and in what, if
anything. (Indicating.)
A

In a paper bag.

All right. How about your
coat?

Q

A

I don't remember of seeing
-67-

any of the others in a bag.

Q In a bag. So that's all

the other clothing that you
are referring to.
But the
pants were in a paper bag,
is that correct?
A

Right.

Q Now, at the hospital, did
you see the blood in the same
condition on this coat as
it is now?
(Indicating.)
A Yes. It was all there.
Is that what you mean?

Q Yes. And did you see the
blood on it at that time?
A

Yes. Yes.

Q And did you see these pants
in this condition at the
hospital?
(Indicating.)
A

Yes.

Q And I'll ask you if these

items that were turned over
to the police, to Officer
Stauffer, were substantially
in the same condition as at
the time you removed them
at the hospital?
A

Yes.
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BANKS:

That's all.

rzE REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY l!R. BARBER:

Q By "substantially" the

same, Miss Link, what do
you mean?

A

They were the same.

Q They looked about the
same?

--

A Well, they hadn't been
touched. I don't know how
they could be any different.

Q Well, I'm not asking you

that. How close did you
examine that pair of --strike
that. You removed your clothes
in the hospital yourself?

A I don't know.
asked me that.

You've

Q You don't know? You don't
know whether you removed
your clothes, but you do
know you looked at them
closely?
A Yes. I could see the
blood on them.

Q Well, what were you doing
at the time you looked at

-69-

them closely?
A I just looked at them.
I couldn't help but see it.

Q While you were -A While I was taking them
off or while they were being
taken off.

Q But you don't know which
one that was?

A

No, I don't.

Q So while you were either

taking your clothes off or
someone else was taking them
off, you looked at them very
closely?
A

Yes.

I could see the blood.

Q You could see some blood?

I notice that you do not say
that you could see any other
kinds of stains on them.
Is that because you didn't
see any particular other stains
on them at that point?

A No, I don't know what you
are saying.

Q You say you saw blood
stains.
Is that about what
you saw when you looked at
the pants was just the pants
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with the blood stains?
A Ily pants don't have any
blood on them. lly levis, is
that what you are talking
about?

Q No. I'm talking about
your panties.
A

I took them off.

Q

You took them off?

A

Uh-huh.

Q And you said you saw the
bloodstains on· them didn't
you?

A Oh, they were the same
way.
They are not --

Q No that's not what I am

asking.
Did you see the blood
stains on them at that time?
A

I don't remember.

Q Did you see any other kind
of stains of them?

A

They were really dirty.

Q They were really dirty?
Did you see any stains on
them?

A

I didn't examine them that
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close.

Q You noticed they were dirty,
but you are not sure they
had the blood stains on them.
A I don't know how else they
could have gotten on them.

Q I don't either. But the
point is, you saw them, saw
that they were dirty, but
you are not sure what they
were dirty with, is that a
fair -A

They were just dirty.

Q Okay. They were dirty.
And without knowing whether
the blood stains were on them
in the hospital, you were
able to testify that they
were the same then as they
are now? (Indicating.)
A
MR.

Sure.
BARBER~

No further questions.

Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence adopted by the Supreme
.
Court of the State of Utah, effective
July 1, 1971 reads as follows:
DISCRETION OF JUDGE TO EXCLUDE
ADMISSABLE EVIDENCE
Except as in these rules
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otherwise pro/ided, the judge
may in his ~scretion exclude
evidence if he finds that
its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the risk that
its admission will (a) necessitate
undue consumption of time
or (b) create substantial
danger of undue prejudice
or of confusing the issues
or of misleading the jury,
or (c) unfairely and harmfully
surprising a party who has
not had reasonable opportunity
to anticipate that such evidence
would be afforded.
A note, found in the published

copy of the Utah Rules of Evidence

after the foregoing contains the
following language:

This applies to frequently
arising situations where the
trial may get out of hand
by the injection of collateral
issues having only slight
probative value in which would
tend to confuse the jury,
and or have illegitimate
emotional appeal. ... this
represents the sort of thing
that the judge does everyday
in actual practice and which
is sanctioned here, in the
assurance that the results
of rare and harmful abusive
discretion will be readily
corrected on appeal. It is
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a rule of necessity.
Its
sanction cannot be escaped
if we are to have orderly
antl efficient trial proceetlure.
The colloquy of counsel with
Miss Link set forth above demonstrates
conclusively that the introduction
of this evidence was at the same
time so prejudicial to the defe~tlant
by reason of the condition of the
clothing as it appeared at trial,
and the failure of the State to
establish the probability that
it's condition had not been materially
changed between the time it was
removed from Miss Link at the
hospital and the time of trial,
that its very introduction denied
defendant due process of the law.
Significant matters about the
clothing which prejudiced the
defendant were the fact that the
shirt worn by the prosecuting
witness was dirty and dusty when
introduced at trial, when the
witness had not testified that
she had ever removed her coat
so that the dirty and tattered
condition of the clothing would
have occurred during the course
of the attack upon her on December
5, and the dusty and soiled condition
of her panties, which if materially
different at trial than they were
when removed from her at the hospital
would permit the jury to infer
that her outer garments were
removed while she was raped. The
condition of th~t clothing was,
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id th the exception of the obliquely

relevant testimony of Dr. Stevenson,
the only real evidence corroborating
the proposition that Miss Link
was undressed and raped in the
shop of Craig Sims on the early
T:lorning of December 5. Unless
her panties had been dirty and
dusty, which would be a normal
result of her having been attacked
sexually on the floor of a shop,
that presumption would be in considerable
doubt.
With reference to Miss Link's
panties> the language at T. 441
is indicative of her lack of sureness
about the condition of the clothing
at the time she removed them at
the hospital. When asked whether
they had blood stains on them she
said "I don't remember" .
When
asked whether she saw any other
kinds of stains on them she said
"They .were really dirty". When
asked whether she saw any stains
she said " I don't examine them
that close". Then the following
sequence occurred:

Q You notice they were dirty,
but you are not sure that they
had blood stains on them.
A I don't know hmv else could
they have gotten on them.

Q I don't know either but
the point is you saw them,
saw that they were dirty,

- 7 r:, -

but you are not sure 'vhat
they were dirty with, is that
a fair A

They were just dirty.

This shows an extreme lack
of definition in the answers and
indicates that she was merely
making assumptions about their
condition on the morning of· December
5 derived from their appearance
sometime later when they appeared
at trial. When it is taken into
account that the clothing was
loose in the basement of her home
for sometime, that they had been
transported in the vehicle very
likely with no container about
them, that any number of people
may have handled them and that
they may have been in any number
of "dirty" places in the home
in the interim, to accept her
word as being sufficient to
establish that the clothes as
they appeared at trial were the
same as they were on December
5 is ridiculous.
The fact of it is that the
trial judge violated both the
spirit and the letter of Rule
45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
when he admitted these items,
particularly the panties.
There
can be no question that this
evidence "created substantial
danger of undue prejudice ... and
misleading the ·jury" by reason

-76-

of the high likelihood that its
condition materially altered
bct1vccn December 5 of 1970 and
October of 1971, when there were
no protective measures taken to
see that the clothes were not
further soiled or their condition
otherwise materially altered.
The case law concerning "chain
of evidence" is not altogether
useful by reason of the fact that
so often it turns on particular
facts present in only one case.
The general rule appears to be
that some change in the condition
of physical evidence between its
seizure and trial is permitted,
particularly when the changes do
not go to the essence of the items
introduced or the particular
features thereof which are relevant
to the items to be proved by their
use. See e.g., Duke vs. State,
58 So.2d 764 (1952) ,Davidson vs.
State, 69 S.2nd 757 and State
vs . Co ope r , 9 2 A. 2nd 7 8 6 ( 19 5 2)
hmvever, some courts have stated
a much more restrictive rule on
chain of evidence, requiring the
State to explain the custody
chronologically from the time of
seizure until the time of introduction
at trial, and with the result that
the failure to establish a 100
percent complete chain of custody
has heen fatal to the introduction
of the evidence. See e.g., McElfresh
vs. Commonwealth, 243 S.1V.2nd 947
[Supreme Court of Kentucky, 1951).
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Although precedents may well
recommend the adoption by this
court of the last stated posture,
such a posture is not necessary
to require the exclusion of the
evidence in this case.
The ambit
of Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, should be defined by an
analysis of the concept of circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence was defined
as follows in People v~ Kennedy,
32 N.Y. 141:
Circumstantial evidence consists
in reasoning from facts which
are known or proved to
es tab 1 ish such as are conjectured
to exist, but the process
is fatally vicious if the
circumstances from which
we seek to deduce the
conclusi(,n depends itself
upon conjecture.
See also People v. Jackson,
8 N.Y. 2d 939 255 App. Div. 688.
The Supreme Court of California
has said: "Circumstantial evidence
is an insurance to be drawn from
fact proved." People v.· Royal,
150 P.2d 812.
See also State v.
Murdock, 34 S.E. 2d S.E. 2d 69
225 N.C. 224.
State v~ Butler,
94 N.E. 2d 457, Sniegowski v. Reese,
61 N.E. 2d 272, 36 Ill. App. 255.
In defining the measures which
are required to. be taken in
protecting against the arrival at
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unjustified conclusions by inferance
from proven fact the Supreme Court of
Arizona has said:
Before a material object may be
admitted in evidence it must
be shmvn that there has been
no substantial change in
conditions since the time in
issue. Witt Ice and Gas
Company v. Bedway, 23 P.2d 952,
72 Aria. 152.
Perhaps the best statement of the Rule
is found in 32 C.J.S. Evidence Section
607 wherein the following language is
found:
In order that an article may be
introduced, it must be
satisfactorily identified and
it must also be shown to the
satisfaction of the Court that
no such substantial change in the
article e.xhib.i ted has taken place such as to render the
evidence misleading but it is
not necessary that the article
be identically the same as at
the time in controversy.
This language dictates the following
conclusion based upon hypothetical
facts:
That if the purpose for which an
Arrow Shirt is introduced into
evidence is to prove that at the
time in question an individual
was wearing an Arrow Shirt, the
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condition of that shirt
is immaterial.
However, where, as here it is
the relative amount of ~oil and
dirt upon clothing which is the
most significant aspect thereof
toward the proof or disproof
of the inference sought to be
established by the State, and
where that soil and dirt was of
a common variety, not unique to
any given location, and where
those clothes were, according
to the testimony of Miss Link,
placed uncovered and unprotected
for a long period of time in the
basement of her home where that
kind of common dirt and soil was
undoubtedly present, the obvious
prejudice is too great to permit
its placement before the jury
without some reasonable explanation.
The witness's vague answers to
questions about the condition
of the clothing when they were
removed from her at the hospital,
her inability to throw any light
upon the care taken in the custody
of the items while they were in
her home, and her obvious use
.
of frail logic rather than observation
to explain the locus and extent
of the stains on the clothing
when they were introduced at trial,
works a positive and a substantial
injustice on the defendant because
of the obvious implication that
if the clothes were that dirty
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1vlien they were at the hospital

on December 5, they got dirty during
the course of a rape, when if a
good portion of that dirt or soil
was placed there after that time
the relative cleanliness of the
clothes at the hospital would work
an opposite inference to which
the defendant is entitled unless
reasonable evidence is adduced
to show that there was not such
a significant change in that interim.

v
INTRODUCTION OF THE TESTIMONY OF
ROBERT YOCKEY WAS REVERABLE ERROR
BECAUSE:
A. THE TESTIMONY IS SO INCREDIBLE
AND YET SO PREJUDICIAL THAT ITS
USE BY THE PROSECUTION EXCEDED
PERMISSIBLE PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
AND DENIED DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS
OF THE LAW.

The particular attention of
this court is directed to the
testimony of Robert Allen Yockey
commencing At T. 94 running through
T. 129. Appellant asserts that
the very content of this testimony
~s so obviously fabricated that
it's falsity and incredulity was,
or ought to have been known by
the prosecution prior to the trial
with the result that its very use
tainted the criminal processes
of this case to the point that
due process of the law was violated.
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This is particularly true in this
case because of the relative
weakness of the evidence that
Pauline Link was raped on the
morning of December 5 and that
the defendant committed that crime.
In many cases, there would be
a sufficiency of corroborating
and direct evidence to establish
the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt which would
render the use of such testimony
non-prejudicial, but when the
evidence is as weak as it is here,
the use of such testimony if
believed in any degree whatever
by the jury, would weight the
scales sufficiently on the side
of guilt to make it material
in the extreme and therefore highly
prejudicial.
The Supreme Court of the United
States, together with the Federal
Courts of Appeal in deciding this
issue as presented on Writs of
Habeas Corpus by defendants convicted
in State Courts, have enunciated
the following basic rule:
The due process of law which
is protected from State and
Federal infringement by the
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments,
respectively, is denied by .
a conviction of crime following
a trial in which perjured
testimony on a material point,
is knowingly used against
the accused, at least where
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it appears that the accused
suffered prejudice by virtue
of the use of such testimony.
Annotation: Due Process-Perjured
Testimony, 2 L.Ed.2nd 1575.
The cases cited in this
annotation all contain statements
of that general rule: Mooney
vs. Holohan 294 U.S. 103, 79 L.Ed
791, 55 S.Ct.317 U.S. 213, 87
L.Ed 214, 63 S.Ct. 177, White
vs. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 89 L.Ed.
1348, 65 S.Ct.978, Alcorta vs.
Texas, 355 U.S 282 L.Ed. 2nd 9,
~ Ct. 103 and Hysler vs.
Florida 315 U.S. 411, 86 L. Ed.
932, 62 S.Ct. 688. In all these
cases the Supreme Court of the
United States reversed convictions
based upon it's finding that the
foregoing rule was violated.
Of particular significance
is Alcorta vs. Texas, supra in
which Alcorta was convicted of
having killed one Kastiloeja upon
provication provided when he caught
Kastiloeja kissing his wife in
a parked car. At trial Kastiloeja
had testified that he was not
in love with the petitioners wife,
that she was not in love with
him and that he had had no dates
With her. Subsequently, at a
hearing on habeas corpus, he
testified that he had had sexual
intercourse with the petitioner's
Wife on five or six occasions

within a relatively brief period
before her death and that the
prosecutor had known those f~cts
prior to the trial. He stated
that the prosecutor had told him
that he if were asked questions
relating to his having had intercours:
with the petitioner's wife he
should answer them truthfully,
but told him not to volunteer
any such information if the questjons
were not directly put to him.
The question was whether or not
that testimony would have been
material to Alcorta's defense
that he killed Kastiloeja in a
surge of passion for which he
had adequate cause. The Supreme
Court reversed, finding that
had Kastiloeja not perjured his
testimony about the relationship
with petitioner's wife the jury
likely would have believed his
defense of passion, and the
f ai 1 ure of the St ate to af fi rmati vcly
adduce the nature of that relationshi;
in the testimony of Kastiloeja
was a violation of the due process
of the laws secured to Alcorta
by the Fourteenth knendment to the
Constitution of the United States.
The respondent will no doubt
cite two elements of the rule
as stated above as being absent
in this case in urging the court
to disregard this assignment of
error; those being the assertion
that the appel~ant has not proven
that the testimony of Yockey was
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perjured nor that the prosecuting
attorney had the requisite knowledge
of the perjured nature of the
testimony required to bring its
use within the proscripti6ns of
the rule stated above. Such a
finding was adopted by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals in the
case of Ryles vs. United States
198 F. 2d 199, in which the Court
found that despite a direct conflict
in the evidence there was insufficient
evidence to establish the fact
that the testimony of narcotics
agents relevant to the case was
perjured. The Court also cited
the failure of the petitioner
to establish that even if the
testimony was perjured, it was
knowingly, willfully, and intentionally
used. Such holdings ·a.re found in
Hubbard vs. Jacques, 95 F.supp.894,Price
vs. Sloap, 178 F.2d 273, cert denied
339 U.S. 985, 94 L.Ed.1388, 70
S.Ct. 1006, and McGuinn vs. United
States, 239 F 2d 449, cert denied
353 U.S. 942, 1 L.Ed. 2d 762,77
S.Ct. 818. In the later case the
court of appeals refused to invalidate
the conviction because the evidence
of the perjured nature of the
testimony adduced by the defendant
was related to the "not unusual
situation where witnesses recollections
differ as to immaterial matters."
Petitioner asserts that the
Lestimony of Robert Yockey in this
case did not relate to the "not
unusual situation where witnesses
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recollections differ as to material
matte:s" but was simply a fabrication
of evidence, which the witness
may or may not have adequate motive
to state, but which related to
the very essence of the issues
upon which appellant was found
guilty.
This entire assignment of
error is based on appellants
assertion that the quality of
the testimony of this witness
was so egregious and obviously
false, that in his discretion,
the District Attorney knew or
ought to have known that its use
would be sufficiently material
and relevant in the· trial of this
issue to deny the defendant due
process of the law, and therefore
the use of that testimony is
sufficient grounds to invalidat~
appellant's convic~ion.
Albeit
that the general rule is that
the mere use of perjured testimony
is not sufficient to violate the
provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but that such a denial
occurs only when it appears that
such tainted testimony is knowing
and intentionally used by the
prosecution, the writer finds
considerable room to question
that statement of the rule because
of its obvious over-emphasis on
the intent of the prosecutor,
which when one places himself
in the shoes of the defendant
convicted upon·perjured testimony,
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is of less than no comfort to him.

a free country a defendant
ought to be secured freedom from
conviction for crime on perjured
testimony in any case. Such a
fundamental evil should be subject
to remedy whether or not the perjured
testimony is knowingly used, or
whether or not the perjured nature
of the testimony itself is discovered
before or after trial. Several
cases relying on the requirement
of knowledge of the prose..cutor
of the perjured nature of the
testimony are found in the annotation
cite~ first above,Tompsett vs.
Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, cert denied
TI:4lJ. S . 8 6 9 -, 8 9 · L. Ed. 14 2 4 , 6 5
S.CL916-,Kmvalak vs. Frisbie,
93 F. Supp 777, In Re Sawyer's
Petition, 229 F.2d 10, cert denied
351 U.S. 966, 100 L.Ed.1486, 76
S.Ct. 1025, and Story vs. Burford,
178 F.2d 911, cert denied 338 U.S.
951, 94 L.Ed.587, 70 S.Ct.482.
The last case concerned a claim
by one convicted in State Court
that he had been denied due process
by virtue of the fact that the
prosecution knowingly used perjured
testimony to secure the conviction.
His assertion was rejected because
the court found that the petitioner
himself did not have any evidence
showing that the prosecuting authorities
or the presiding judge knew that
the witnesses were perjuring themselves.
A better statement of the rule
is found in Jones vs. Kentucky,
97 F.2ci 335, in which a \Vrit of
In
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Habeas Corpus was granted where
it appeared that the conviction
had been obtained by the use of
perjured testimony notwithstanding
that it was not shown that the
state prosecuting officers knew
the testimony to have been false.
The Court stated that the fundarnenta!
concept of justice which lie at
the base of our ci vi 1 and political
institutions must condemn as a
travesty a conviction upon perjured
testimony if later its falseness
is discovered, and the State in
such a case is therefore required
to afford a correctional judicial
process to remedy the alleged
wrong if constitutional rights
are not to be impaired.
Certain
cases, in extending the rule
stated in Jones, seem to have
implied that constructive knowledge
of the falsety of testimony used
in a trial may be sufficient to
violate the rule.
In Wilde vs.
Oklahoma, 187 F.2d 409 the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated
that the use of false testimony
will constitute a denial of due
process where the prosecuting
officers uknew, or ... had reason
to believe that the testimony
offered at trial was false or
perjured."
The foregoing is precisely
what appellant is asserting here.
The testimony of Jay D. Edmonds,
.Assistant District Attorney,
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commencing at Volume VI of the
Trial Transcript Page 135, that
upon discovering that Yockey had
stated that he had heard Sims make
statements about his implication
in this crime, he took Yockey to
the Office of the District Attorney
and there inquired of him about
his testimony, shows a remarkable
lack of probing by the District
Attorney's Office to determine
the truth or falsity of the proffered
testimony. Integrity in the administration
of justice ought to impose a duty
upon prosecuting officers to make
reasonable inquiry, at least a
cross-examination of a witness
whose testimony appears to be
related to a crime, to test that
testimony and provide facts upon
which to make an independent
finding of its probable validity.
In this case no such an interrogation
occurred, nor was there any effort
made to corroborate the testimony
with others who may have been
involved. That entire duty fell
to the defense which was in a far
inferior position to come to reasonable
conclusions.
Particularly relevant to this
issue is the case of Mesarosh vs.
United States, 352 U.S. 1, 11.Ed.,
2d 1, 77 S.Ct.l, (1956) in which the
Supreme Court of the United States
reversed the conviction of defendant
for violation of the Smith Act
\•:here, on argument at the Supreme
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Court the Soliciter General of
the United States, though he did
not allege that the testimony
upon which petitioner had been
convicted was necessarily perjurious 1
simply indicated to the Court
that there was a finding that
other testimony given at other
times and places by the witness
Mazzei was inconsistent and u.ncorrobor
The Supreme Court said:
Either this Court or the
District Court should accept
the statements of the Soliciter
General as indicating the
unreliability of this government
witness. The question of
whether his untruthfulness
in these other proceedings
constituted perjury or was
caused by a psychiatric conditi~
can make no material difference.
Whichever explanation might
be found to be correct in
this regard, Mazzei's credibili~
has been wholly discredited
by the disclosure of the
Soliciter General. No other
conclusion is possible. The
dianity
of the United States
b
•
Government will not permit
the conviction of any person
on tainted testimony. This
conviction is tainted and
there can be other just result
than to accort petitioners
a new trial.

The integrity of judicial
process in Utah should not be held
to be less sacred than those same
processes in the Federal Government.
Furthermore, the fair administration
of the criminal Law should not
be left to the prosecutor's decision
\vhether to acknowledge the "taint"
on his case or not. A reading
of the testimony of Robert Allen
Yockey will demonstrate that his
testimony was tainted, and that
the holding of the Supreme Court
that once that is determined there
is no alternative but to reverse
the conviction for a new trial
ought to be adopted by this Court,
as a demonstration of the intolerance
of this body for tainted judicial
processes in the State of Utah.
VI
REFUSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT

TO PERMIT THE TESTIMONY OF JACK

BRADY CONCERNING THE CHARACTER
OF THE PROSECUTRIX WAS REVERSABLE
ERROR.
At Page 357 of the Transcript
of the Trial, the defense made
a proffer in chambers of testimony
proposed to be introduced by one
Jack Brady. That proffer indicated
that Mr. Brady, if permitted to
testify, would testify that on
or about October 30 he met the
complaining witness at a party,
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that they talked for a brief
period after which they went to his
car in which the prosecutrix
permitted him to take considerable
sexual liberty with her. He
would further have testified
that he could have engaged in
sexual intercourse with her at
that time but that he did not for
reasons unrelated to her consent
or refusal. He would have testified
that t·liss Link gave him her phone numbe
and invited him to call her at any tiJ11e
He would have said that he was certa~
that had he called her he could have
engaged in sexual intercourse with her
with no difficulty. He would have
further said that he was the one who
gave Mr. Sims Miss Link's number and
recommended that should he call her
he would undoubtedly be able to engage
in sexual intercourse with her.
At that time the defense stated
that by reason of Niss Link's testim~
that Mr. Sims had asked her to have
sexual intercourse with him and that
she refused, there arose an implicatio~
that his frustration at that refusal
caused him to engage in the stratagem
by which he took her to his shop,
ass aul te d her, and had sexual intercou
with her while she was unconscious.
At the conclusion of the legal argu~ef
about this prof fer proper the trial
court refused the defense request
to introduce this testimony.
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!Vhigmore states the majority
ru] e as follows:
Ordinarily, the woman's chaste
character is not in issue on
a charge of rape (though her
consent is material), and her
acts of unchastity with other
men may be admissable to evidence
probability of consent on this
occasion.
Other than the exception designed
to permit evidence of the character
of the prosecuting witness as it
relates to the issue of consent where
that issue is raised by the facts
of the case, the Courts have generally
held that the reputation of the
prosecuting witness for chastity
is inadrnissable as irrelevant. That
holding is the law in the State of
Utah as set forth Court in State
vs. Scott 55 U. 553, 118 P. 860;
In view that the defendantdenied that he was with the
prosecutrix on the night in
question and denied that he
had had sexual intercourse with
her then or at any time, we
cannot conceive how such evidence
had any relevancy in this case,
except perhaps to affect the
creditibility of the prosecutrix.
It was however, not offered
for that purpose, and it is
not contended here that it
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shoul<l have been admitted fur
that purpose.
Where the defendant
admits the sexual act, but
contends that the prosecutrix
consented thereto, and where,
as he re, she is of laHful ao e
such evidence is relevant a~d,
material upon the question of
consent.
While it is true that
even a prostitute may refuse
consent to the sexual act, yet,
in contemplation of law, a
lewd woman is much more likely
to consent to such an act than
a chaste woman would be; hence
evidence that the prosecutrix
was generally reputed to be
unchaste is relevant for the
purpose just stated. (Cases
cited)
The facts of this case, however,
introduce a slightly different twist
both into the facts and the law upon
which the holding in scott is based,
by reason of the fact that they
present a factual situation in which
evidence of the prosecuting witnesses
chastity is relevant directly on
the issue of her creditibility as
well as to permit the defendant to
rebut an obvious presumption introduced
by the prosecution; to-wit, that
it may have been the refusal of
the prosecuting witness to consent
to have intercourse with the defendant
that occasioned the commission of
the crime.
The appellant testified
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the trial as follows:

Q We drove up Millcreek Canyon

we got just past Log Haven,
we met some kids backing down
in a pickup truck.
They said
the roads were too slick to
get up any further.
We drove
back down the canyon a ways,
and pulled over and stopped
for a few minutes.

Q What happened while you were
stopped if anything?

A Well, first I got out and
went to the restroom -- or
something similar.
I got back
in the truck.

Q In the truck?
A Car, excuse me.
I got back
in the car and Lina told me
that she was really glad that
I had called her.
She was glad
that she had come and she commented
that she was balling this other
guy regularly and would feel
sort of guilty.
I really
didn't know quite what to
say.
I told her I understood.
She put her arms around me
and kissed me.
I kissed
her back and suggested that
we go down the canyon to
a friends --down out of
the canyon to a friend's
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house. _There_was usually
something going on. It was
the weekend so we drove down
the canyon and we went to
this friends of mine house.
(T.103-104).
He said that after he left the
party they drove around in search
of Miss Link's boyfriend. After
failing to find him at any of
the locations they checked, the
defendant said Niss Link made
the following statement.
We drove up the street and
she said she just wanted
to drive by and see if it
--his car was there, if
he wasn't there then should
could have a good time and
wouldn't have a guilty conscious
about it.
Appellant asserts that the
logical thrust of this statement
of the prosecuting witness was
that by reason of the fact that
she refused to have intercourse
with Sims because of her boyfriend,
after they made an unsuccessful
search for him she would not mind
engaging in sexual intercourse
with him.
The likelihood that
a man would physically assault
and molest a woman while she was
unconscious who had made clear
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to him that she would not object
to havtng intercourse with him
is preposterous.
It is her credibility
both as to her denial that she
ever consented to have intercourse
11 ith Sims, and the likelihood
demonstrated by Brady's testimony
tho. t her s ta temen t of implying
consent to Sims Has true that
makes Brady's testimony relevant.
It can only be assumed that if
she would consent to have sexual
intercourse with one person, the
likelihood is greater that she
woul<l consent to have intercourse
with another, that is to quote
the Utah Supreme Court, "a lewd
woman is much more likely to
consent to such an act than a
chaste woman would be".
Of further significance is
the theory put forward by the
appellant in argument to the jury
that Miss Link had permitted the
inference that Sims had assaulted
her to arise, not really believing
that he could be convicted on
the evidence on such a crime,
by reason of the fact that she
\vanted to hide from the pub 1 ic
and her parents and fact that
~he had regularly been having
intercourse with her boyfriend.
With reference to a similar proposition
the Supreme Court of Utah in
~ , supra, stated as follows:
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It was theory of counsel
for the defendant however,
that the prosecutrix in
this case had had intercourse
with the individual heretofore
referred to; (not the defendant)
that she tried, but was
unable to see such individual,
and that for that reason
and in order to shield
herself in view of her supposed
pregnancy she wrongfully
1
charged the defendant with
t
the offense. No doubt if
a
such were the case the
t
defendant would have the
Cj
right to prove by her on
cross-examination, if he
could, that such was the
purpose in lodging the
complaint against the defendant, CIPJ
and, in order to establish
rev
the fact he no doubt would
and
be permitted to prove that
upo
she had had intercourse
ci tJ
with the individual aforesaid. or c
Under such circumstances
for
it is always proper to show.
opin
the motives of the prosecuting
witness, and if such be
the fact that she is wrongfull
accusing' the defendant either
to shield herself or shield
another.
This holding is squarely.
in point, particularly where it
-98-

is seen that the testimony of
did not relate to an independent
an unrelated act of sexual intercourse
1.i th another, but merely the
fact that she had consented, after
a very brief rneeting, to have
intercourse with Brady. The damage
to the prosecuting witness and
the danger of a trial of collateral
is~ues, those being the main
foundations for the exclusionary
rule, clearly do not apply in
this case, with the result that
the testimony should have been
admitted. The failure of the
trial court to do so is reversable
error.
llrndy

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated the
appellant prays that this Court
reverse the verdict of the jury
and the judgment of conviction
upon the offense of rape, and
either dismiss the information
or direct that the case be remanded
for new trial consisted with the
opinion of this court.
Respectfully submitted,
James N. Barber
455 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant.
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